In a much-awaited decision, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on November 10, 2020, in A.J.R. v. Lute, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5168, that educators are immune from liability for student-on-student bullying where there is no history of violence between the students involved.
Summary of Facts
The plaintiffs alleged that their child, A.J.R., was subjected to various forms of bullying -- name-calling, teasing, social exclusion, and physical bullying— which ultimately escalated to A.J.R. being assaulted with a sharpened pencil by another student, S. The students were kindergarteners. A.J.R.’s parents claim to have reported the bullying to the students’ teacher, assistant principal, and principal, however, claim the teacher and administrators failed to take any appropriate actions to address the bullying and prevent this pencil incident.
The teacher and administrators claimed that they took various steps to address the reports of bullying they received from A.J.R.’s parents including speaking with the students who had teased A.J.R., including S, after which it stopped; monitoring the students in the classroom and intervening if any teasing occurred; frequently checking in with A.J.R. to see how things are going; and developing a relationship of trust such that if anything were wrong, A.J.R. would have said so. Significantly, the teacher and administrators said there was no history of any violence between the students.
Legal Proceedings
The parents of A.J.R. filed suit against the teacher and administrators in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas alleging they were reckless in preventing this violent attack. In response to the suit, the teacher and administrators filed a motion for summary judgment in which they asserted that they were immune from individual liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) because A.J.R.’s parents had failed to produce any evidence the teacher and administrators acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner with respect to A.J.R. They argued that there was no evidence that they had known or had had reason to know that S. posed a risk of physical harm to A.J.R. or other students. The trial court agreed, explaining without evidence that S. had a history of physically harming other students or staff, there was no question of fact regarding whether the teacher and administrators consciously disregarded or were indifferent to a known risk of physical harm to A.J.R.
The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment in a split decision and the teacher and administrators appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court to answer the following proposition of law:
There can be no finding of reckless conduct or perverse disregard of a known risk where the record establishes that in response to reports of student teasing, educators promptly speak with the students about the teasing, frequently ask the students how they are doing, and regularly monitor the students in the lunchroom and classroom. Under these circumstances, if a student with no history of violence later pokes another student with a pencil, R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) shields these educators from liability. 2020-Ohio-5168, ¶ 11
Legal Analysis
Pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), public school teachers and administrators are immune from liability unless one of three subsections applies. Meaning they cannot be held legally responsible unless one of the exceptions applies. In A.J.R., the relevant subsection is R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), which provides that an employee is not immune from liability if the employee’s acts or omissions were “reckless.” 2020-Ohio-5168, ¶ 17. To put it another way, to establish liability against the teacher and administrators, A.J.R.’s parents must prove they were reckless.
In applying R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), the Ohio Supreme Court previously defined “recklessness” as “a perverse disregard of a known risk.” O’Toole v. Denihan (2008), 118 Ohio St.3d 374. “Recklessness . . . necessarily requires something more than mere negligence. The actor must be conscious that his conduct will in all probability result in injury.” Id. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court found “[r]eckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson v. Massillon (2012), 134 Ohio St.3d 380.
In A.J.R., the Court focused on the issues presented in the motion for summary judgment, i.e. whether there was evidence to demonstrate that the teacher and administrators had knowledge of any risk of physical harm. 2020-Ohio-5168, ¶ 18. In holding for the teacher and administrators, the Court reasoned that there was only evidence of verbal bullying and one incident of pushing. Id. at ¶ 19. The A.J.R. Court held “[b]ased on the record before us, the allegation that S. pushed A.J.R. while they were in line, on its own, is insufficient to show that [the teacher and administrators] should have been aware that S. might cause physical harm to A.J.R.” Id. at ¶ 21. Without such knowledge of this risk, the teacher and administrators could not have been reckless. Id.
The A.J.R. Court went on to say that, even if there was knowledge of the risk, the A.J.R.’s parents failed to present evidence that would support the teacher and administrators disregarded that risk. Id. at ¶ 22. Instead, the Court reasoned the opposite was true since the teacher and administrator took steps to address the reports of bullying and to address A.J.R.’s class to curtail it. Id. The Court reasoned “[t]he fact that [the teacher and administrators] paid special attention to A.J.R. and the situation shows that they neither consciously disregarded any risk nor were indifferent to any risk.” Id. at ¶ 24.
Ultimately, the Court reversed the Sixth District’s ruling and reinstated the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the teacher and administrator on the basis that they are immune Id. at ¶ 29.
Conclusion
While teachers and administrators will point to A.J.R. as a re-affirmation of immunity in bullying claims, it is not blanket-immunity. A.J.R. was decided upon the facts and record before the Court. The question remains how Ohio courts will interpret A.J.R. in cases involving middle school or high school students, cases where there is a clearer record of physical violence or cases where the teacher and administrators did not take such care to address the reports of bullying.
If your child has sustained an injury as a result of a malicious attack by a schoolyard bully, please contact Scott for a no cost, no obligation consultation and case evaluation.
